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Abstract: 
Land regulations have a major impact on economic development, especially in agrarian 
societies, and they continue to affect the efficiency of the rural economy when economies 
further develop. This paper aims to give an overview of the regulations that are present in 
the land market in the EU member states and builds a land regulatory index to quantify the 
extent of regulations of agricultural land sales and rental markets.  
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Land Market Regulations in Europe 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a large literature on the importance of well-functioning land markets as a 
key determinant for agricultural development and – even more broader - its essential 
role in economic growth and development (Feder and Deininger, 1999). In the 
agricultural sector, land is not only a mean to generate a livelihood but it is also used to 
accumulate wealth and transfer wealth between generations. Further, land property 
rights and exchange affect the emergence and efficiency of financial markets (Deininger 
and Feder, 2002). Therefore, well-functioning land markets play an essential role for 
economic growth and development.  
Land issues are widely discussed and recommendations on land use and 
ownership have known important evolutions. Much attention was focused on the 
individualization of common lands, the desirability for owner-operated family farms on 
both efficiency and equity grounds, the importance of secure property rights to land in 
eliciting effort and investment and in providing the basis for land transactions; and the 
need for a policy and regulatory environment that promotes transfers to more efficient 
land uses.  
Private land ownership and land (sales) markets were promoted and stimulated 
because (a) land sales transfer full rights to the new user, (b) they increase access to 
credit as owned land can be used for collateral purposes, and (c) they provide optimal 
incentives for investment by providing permanent security of rights (Binswanger et al., 
1995; Deininger and Jin, 2003).  However, the sceptical view of land rental markets has 
given away to a recognition of their critical role as a means for providing the poor with 
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access to land (Deininger and Biswanger, 1999). Efficiency-enhancing effects are 
assigned to land rental markets since the rental market is more likely to allow land 
transfers from less to more productive users than the sales market (Sadoulet et al., 
2001). Rental contracts can directly improve efficiency by compensating for market 
failures to which tenants are subjected. In the short-run, land rental markets have 
welfare effects because access to land enables better use of indivisible assets and allows 
households to use idle assets that can only be valorized through access to land, such as 
captive family labour and unused managerial and supervisory skills. Land policies and 
regulations will affect the functioning of land sales and rental markets and therefore 
have important efficiency and equity consequences. However, while some land market 
imperfections and restrictions are rather well documented, comparative country wide 
data on existing land regulations are missing. 
A good understanding of the functioning of agricultural land markets – and thus of 
the ruling regulations - is also relevant from a policy point of view. First, land 
regulations are expected to interact with agricultural policies. Several authors have 
already analyzed the capitalization of agricultural subsidies on land prices in the EU (e.g. 
Patton et al., 2008; Ciaian et al., 2010, Ciaian and Kancs, 2012; Van Herck et al., 2013). In 
general, these studies show that while agricultural subsidies are part of a community 
wide agricultural policy, their redistributive impact varies strongly between member 
states. One potential explanation is that capitalization of agricultural subsidies depends 
on the specific land market regulations which differ among member state. Therefore, 
comparative country wide information on land regulations will be crucial to assess to 
what extent community wide policies, such as agricultural subsidies, have a different 
redistributive impacts among EU Member States.  
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Second, land regulations may affect sustainable land management and biodiversity. 
For example in Czech Republic, land ownership is highly fragmented. While land sales 
are thin and land consolidation through sales is rare, land rental occurs frequently so 
that large production blocks are created. This results in a “homogenization” of 
agricultural land use through the rental market with negative consequences for 
sustainable land use (e.g. soil erosion, flooding) and biodiversity (Sklenicka et al. 2014). 
Land market imperfections (e.g. transaction costs) as well as regulations might have 
contributed and/or sustained this land use homogenization. Hence, understanding how 
regulations affect the functioning of land sales and rental markets can help to design 
informed policies to promote sustainable land management. Another study showed that 
the implementation of a specific land regulation in Bulgaria, namely the implementation 
of a minimum plot size, led to co-ownership of parcels (Vranken et al., 2011). Land in co-
ownership is related to significant welfare losses and is more likely to be used by less 
efficient farm organizations or to be left abandoned. Even though land abandonment can 
have a positive influence on biodiversity (rewilding), it may also threaten farmland 
biodiversity in general as well as functional diversity associated with anthropogenic 
landscapes of high nature values (Sirami et al., 2008; Plieninger et al., 2014; Zakkak et 
al., 2014, Peco et al., 2012). Hence, land regulations that affect land allocation and use 
can have important environmental consequences.  
This paper is an attempt to bring together comparative data on land regulations for 
several EU member states. We give an overview of the regulations that are present in the 
different land markets (both sales and rental markets) in the EU Member States and 
develop several regulatory indices in order to get a quantitative measure for the extent 
of regulations of agricultural sales and rental markets in the EU.1  
                                                 
1 In a related paper by Swinnen et al. (2014), we provide explanations and hypotheses for the observed 
differences in land regulations across the EU member states. 
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we document the differences in 
land regulations in the EU member states. In section 3, we construct a set of regulation 
indices to quantify the information on land regulations and discuss the differences in the 
indicators between the different EU member states. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Measures of Land Regulations 
To assess the importance of land regulations and to indicate the differences 
between countries, we have collected data on land regulations using 15 different 
variables. We classify the variables in four sub-categories of land market regulations: 
(1) measures to protect the tenant; (2) measures to protect the small owner-cultivator; 
(3) measures to protect the non-farm owner; and (4) measures to prevent 
fragmentation. The variables and the classification are summarized in Table 1. The 
information on regulations (variables) was obtained from (structured) interviews with 
local land experts in each of the countries, which includes an update of information of 
country studies of land markets reported in the comparative study of Ciaian et al. 
(2010). All information refers to the regulations that were in place in 2011.  
 
2.1 Measures to protect the tenant 
Land market regulations aiming to protect the tenant include regulations that 
impose maximum rental prices, minimum rental contract duration, automatic rental 
contract renewal, conditions for rental contract termination and pre-emptive buying 
right of the tenant. Table 2 gives an overview of the relevant variables with respect to 
land market regulations that aim to protect the tenant.  
Maximum Rental Price refers to the existence of a regulation that determines a 
maximum rental price. Maximum rental prices are stipulated in agricultural land 
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legislation in Belgium, France and the Netherlands.2 In all three countries, maximum 
rental prices depend on the agronomic quality (expected marginal productivity) of a 
plot. For example, in Belgium, rental prices are determined by multiplying the cadastral 
value of the plot and a regional ‘tenancy coefficient’. These ‘tenancy coefficients’ are 
determined by a commission composed of members of the regional governments and 
the professional organizations based on the evolution of the regional agricultural 
profitability in the past six years (Ciaian et al., 2010). A similar pricing mechanism based 
on agricultural productivity to determine rental prices exists in France. In addition to 
this strict form of price regulation, there exist in some other countries also a more 
moderate form of price regulation. For example, in Austria rental contracts need to be 
approved by a local public authority, the “Grundverkehrsbehörde”, which can disapprove 
a rental transaction when the rental price determined in the contract is 50% higher than 
the average price in the region.   
Minimum Rental Contract Duration refers to the existence of a  minimum duration 
for a rental contract. In several countries, the national legislation stipulates a minimum 
duration for a rental contract. This is the case in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
Automatic Rental Contract Renewal captures whether a rental contract is 
automatically renewed at the end of the original contract with the initial duration of the 
contract, or not. In many EU countries, rental contracts are automatically renewed, but 
                                                 
2 In the Netherlands, there exist three types of rental contracts since 2007 (Ministerie van Economische 
Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie, 2012). First, there are the traditional or regular rental contracts, which 
have a minimum duration of at least six years. These contracts are subjected to price restrictions. Second, 
there are the so-called “liberalized rental contracts”, which can have a duration of less than six years or 
more than six years. In case the duration is less than six years there are no price restrictions. However, in 
case that the duration is more than six years, the same price restrictions as for regular rental contracts 
apply. Finally, there are seasonal rental contracts, which are solely used for the purpose of crop rotation 
and for which there are no price restrictions. Since the majority (approximately 70%) of the rented land is 
still captured in long-term regular rental contracts, we take in account the regulations that apply for 
regular rental contracts to construct the regulatory indicator of the Netherlands. 
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the extent of the automatic renewal differs. Land rental contracts in Belgium, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Slovakia and Slovenia are automatically 
renewed by the length of the initial contract period in case neither the owner nor the 
tenant wants to end the contract. In Austria, Germany, the UK and the Czech Republic, 
rental contracts are prolonged with a duration of one season.  
Conditions for Rental Contract Termination captures the conditions under which a 
rental contract can be ended by the owner. In Belgium, France and the Netherlands, the 
(automatic) extension of a rental contract can only be prevented by the owner under 
certain specific conditions (e.g. when the owner or a (close) relative decides to cultivate 
the plot him/herself). Otherwise the rental contract is automatically renewed with the 
previous tenant. Note that in most countries the contract can be also cancelled before 
the end date of contract, but in this is mainly in case the tenant does not fulfil his 
contractual obligations (e.g. not paying the rent,…). 
Pre-emptive Right of the Tenant refers the existence of a pre-emptive right for the 
tenant. Tenants have a pre-emptive right to buy land in Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, 
Sweden, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania and Slovenia. However, 
there are differences between countries in the implementation of the pre-emptive right. 
For example, in the Netherlands the pre-emptive right is only valid for regular rental 
contracts in case the land is not purchased by a so-called “safe buyer”, which provides 
the tenant a written declaration that he can continue to rent the land under the same 
conditions as before the sale. For liberalized rental contracts or seasonal rents, the pre-
emptive right is no longer valid in the Netherlands. 
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2.2 Measures to protect the (local) owner-cultivator  
Land market regulations which aim to protect the owner-cultivator include 
restrictive conditions on the owner (such as nationality), maximum sales prices, a pre-
emptive right- for neighboring farmers and a maximum on the transacted area. Table 3 
gives an overview of the variables related to land market regulations that aim to protect 
the (local) owner-cultivator.  
Nationality of the Owner for Natural Persons or Legal Entities refers to regulations 
that prohibit that foreigners can buy agricultural land. Restrictions on foreigners to buy 
land are especially important in the EU new member states (Swinnen and Vranken, 
2009). Local farmers feared that foreigners (West European farmers and real estate 
investors) would acquire large parts of their land. Foreign investors were attracted by 
low land prices while local farmers had much lower incomes, lower farm subsidies and 
higher capital costs with poor functioning rural capital markets. While there exist 
restrictions on foreign ownership in all EU new member states (with the exception of 
Slovenia and Czech Republic), the precise nature differs among EU member states.3. In 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia, regulation is the most stringent and foreign 
natural persons are only allowed after renting and farming a plot for at least three years 
to buy this particular plot. In Lithuania, foreign natural persons are allowed to buy any 
plot of agricultural land in case they have been staying and farming in the country for at 
least three years or when they are married to a national citizen. In Bulgaria and 
Romania, regulation on foreign ownership is the least stringent among all new member 
states and foreign natural persons who wish to settle and farm in the country are 
                                                 
3 Originally, restrictions on foreign ownership of land were allowed for a transitional period of seven 
years (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania) or twelve years 
(Poland) after the year of accession. This implies that for the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania Hungary 
and Slovakia, the transitional period expired in 2011. However, except for the Czech Republic, all 
countries applied for an extension of the transitional period and they were granted an extension until 
2014. 
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allowed to buy agricultural land.4 In general, there are less restrictions on foreign 
ownership for legal entities, except for Hungary, Latvia and Poland. In Hungary the 
government prohibits sales of agricultural land to all legal entities, including foreign 
legal entities. Latvia and Poland allow sales of agricultural land to legal entities, but only 
in case a minority of the shares is owned by foreigners. In addition, also in the old 
member states there are some restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land. In 
Greece, foreigners (legal entities and natural persons) are only allowed to buy or rent 
agricultural land in border regions in case they received approval by the (local) 
authorities. In Finland, there are restrictions to buy land in the region, Aland. 
Requirements (other than nationality) for land owners captures whether there are 
other conditions (than nationality) that needs to be fulfilled by a new owner. Such 
restrictions exist in Austria, Denmark, Spain, Hungary and Poland. In Austria, new 
owners of agricultural land should have their residence relatively close to the plot and 
have a proof of competence in the agricultural sector (through experience or education). 
Also in Poland, farmers should have a proof of competence in the agricultural sector 
(through experience or education). In Hungary, there is a legal obligation for the new 
owner to ensure that the land is cultivated.  
Maximum Sales Price captures whether there is maximum price for agricultural 
land. In none of the countries, there exists a well-defined maximum sales price, but in 
Austria, France and Poland, the government can interfere in the sales market of 
agricultural land in case the sales price of agricultural land is considered too high. In 
Austria, sales transactions need to be approved by the Grundverkehrsbehörde” which 
may block the transaction when the price is considered to be too high and where there is 
suspicion of “speculation”. Similarly in France, all sales transactions of agricultural land 
                                                 
4 In Romania, foreign natural persons need a prove of their ability to farm.  
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need to be authorized by the SAFERs (Sociétés pour l’aménagement foncier et 
l’établissement rural) (Latruffe and Le Mouel, 2006). The SAFERs can disapprove a 
transaction when there is suspicion of “speculation”. In Poland, sales prices of 
agricultural land are in principle free, but when the sales price of an agricultural plot is 
“extremely high”, a party with a pre-emptive right may ask for a downward correction of 
the sales price to the local authorities. 
Pre-emptive Right of Neighboring Farmer refers to the existence of a pre-emptive 
right for a neighboring farmer. In France, Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, 
neighboring farmers have a pre-emptive right to buy in the case a plot of agricultural 
land is sold. 
Maximum Transacted/ Owned Area captures whether there is a maximum area that 
a farmer is allowed to transact or to own. There exist size limitations on the amount 
owned or transacted land in Denmark, France, Hungary and Lithuania. In France, the 
SAFER can refuse a transaction if it considers the amount of land that is sold too high. In 
Hungary, an individual farmer can own and cultivate up to 300ha, while a legal entity 
(farming company) is not allowed to own any agricultural land and can only cultivate up 
to 2500ha of (leased) land. In Lithuania, there is an upper limit on the amount of land 
that can be owned by a natural person or a legal entity (up to 500 ha).  
 
2.3 Measures to protect the land owner  
Regulations to protect the land owner include the maximum duration of a contract 
and minimum rental prices. Table 4 gives an overview of the variables related to land 
market regulations that aim to protect the land owner. 
Minimum Rental Price captures whether there is a minimum rental price. Austria, 
Czech Republic, France and the Netherlands regulate the minimum rental price. In 
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Austria, rental contracts need to be approved by the "Grundverkehrsbehörde” and this 
authority can disapprove the rental transaction when the rental price determined in the 
contract is 50% lower than the average price in the region. In France, there is a legal 
minimum rental price for all land transactions, which depends on soil quality and 
location of the plot. In the Czech Republic, there is no legal minimum price for 
agricultural land, but in case of disputes between the owner and the tenant the 
government can decide to set the rent at one percent of the administrative price of the 
plot. 
Maximum Rental Contract Duration refers to regulations on the maximum duration 
of rental contracts. Countries with a maximum duration on rental contracts are 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Hungary and Poland.5  
 
2.4 Measures to prevent fragmentation6 
Regulations to prevent land fragmentation include regulations on pre-emptive 
buying rights of the co-owner and minimum plot size. Table 4 gives an overview of the 
variables related to land market regulations that aim to prevent fragmentation of land. 
Minimum Plot Size captures whether there is a minimum plot size below which a 
plot cannot be subdivided for a transaction  There exists a legal minimal plot size in five 
countries: Germany, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia. In Germany, when a 
landowner wants to split a plot of one ha, he/she will need to have permission from the 
                                                 
5 In some countries there are restrictions on the maximum duration of very long rental contracts, but we 
did not consider these as a measure to protect the owner. For example, in Bulgaria, there exist “Arenda” 
contracts with maximum duration up to 50 years and in Belgium, there exists “erfpacht” contracts which 
can have a maximum duration of 99 years. 
6 Note that also other institutions have emerged in response to concerns on land fragmentation. Rules on 
how land and other assets are passed from one generation to the next in farming families have a 
significant impact on land markets and land fragmentation (particularly in civil code countries). The 
inheritance rules differ significantly in Western Europe (Blanc and Perrier Cornet, 1993). In countries 
under Common Law, such as England and Wales, the land (and the farm) is typically passed to the oldest 
son, contributing to the preservation of the farm. In countries where inheritance rules are based on the 
Napoleonic Code / Civil Code, there was traditionally a division of the land among the heirs.  
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local authority, which can prevent this transaction. In Bulgaria, the minimum plot size 
for agricultural land is 0.3 ha. Vineyards and pastures have a minimum plot size of 
respectively 0.1 ha and 0.2 ha. In Lithuania, the legal minimum plot size is 0.01 ha. 
Pre-emptive Right of the Co-owner refers to the existence of a pre-emptive right of 
the co-owner. Pre-emptive rights for the co-owner to buy land exist in Italy, Portugal, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
 
3. Land Regulation Indices 
3.1. Approach 
To enhance the overall comparison between countries, we attempt to quantify the 
information we collected by constructing a set of regulation indices. More specifically 
we create a “Tenant Protection Index” (TPI), a “Owner Protection Index” (OPI) and a 
(total) “Land Regulation Index” (LRI).  
Table 1 summarizes how the qualitative information for each of the variables is 
used to create quantitative indicators. For most of the variables this is a simple 0-1 
quantification. This applies especially when it concerns the existence of a specific 
law/regulation or not. More specifically this 0-1 quantification applies to all variables 
except three:  
For the variables Automatic Rental Contract Renewal, Nationality of the Owner for 
Natural Persons and Nationality of the Owner for Legal Entities more options are 
possible. We used our judgement based on our interviews and the qualitative analysis to 
impose a quantification. Automatic Rental Contract Renewal takes a value of one when a 
rental contract is automatically renewed at the end of the original contract with the 
initial duration of the contract (or at least a duration of more than one season); a value 
of a half when a rental contract is automatically renewed at the end of the original 
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contract with a duration of only one season; and a value of zero when there is no 
automatic renewal of the contract. Nationality of the Owner for Natural Persons takes a 
value of one when foreign natural persons are allowed to buy a particular plot of 
agricultural land if they have been staying and farming in the country for at least three 
years and they rented the particular plot before, or when they are married to a national 
citizen; a value of three quarter when foreign natural persons are allowed to buy any 
plot of agricultural land in case they have been staying and farming in the country for at 
least three years, or when they are married to a national citizen; a value of a half when 
foreign natural persons are allowed to buy any plot of agricultural land in case they 
want to stay and farm in the country; a value of a quarter when foreign natural persons 
are allowed to buy any plot of agricultural land, except land in specific regions (e.g. 
border regions), where they need to have approval by the authorities; and a value of 
zero when there are no restrictions on ownership by foreign natural persons and. 
Nationality of the Owner for Legal Entities, which takes a value of one when legal entities 
with shares owned by foreigners are prohibited to buy agricultural land; a value of a half 
when legal entities with a majority of the shares owned by foreigners are prohibited to 
buy land, but legal entities with a minority of the shares owned by foreigners are 
allowed to buy land; a value of a quarter when legal entities with shares owned by 
foreigners are only allowed to buy land in some specific regions (e.g. border region) 
after approval by the local authorities and a value of zero when there are no restrictions 
on ownership by foreign owned legal entities.  
Finally, we constructed the aggregation variables TPI, OPI and LRI by first simply 
adding the various variables. The TPI captures the measures to protect the tenant, the 
OPI captures the measures to protect the small owner-cultivator and the LRI captures 
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all measures listed in table 1. Afterwards we used different weights in the aggregation to 
see how sensitive the results are to our aggregation approach.  
 
3.2. Indices 
Figure 1 and Table 5 presents the TPI, the OPI and the total LRI.  The indices 
reflect the large differences among the EU countries in land market regulations (Figure 
1 and Table 5). They also illustrate clearly that the variation in interventions is not a 
simple East-West divide. Both among the new and among the old member states there 
are strongly regulated and very liberal approaches in land governance.   
For the 24 EU member states for which we have data, the most regulated land 
“markets” are in France (LRI = 9) and Hungary (LRI = 8). In France, regional 
organizations – the so-called SAFERs – determine a minimum and maximum price 
bracket within which the tenant and the owner can agree a contract price. These 
organisations effectively control the local land markets through their powers to buy, sell 
and rent out agricultural land.  Effectively, they ensure that land is only owned by 
working farmers. The SAFERs also control the level of farm restructuring and growth by 
requiring farmers to get authorisation from them for farm expansion (Latruffe et al., 
2013). In Hungary, land can only be owned by individuals or families (“natural persons”) 
– not by farming companies which operate a large share of the land. Ownership is 
restricted to Hungarian nationals and owners have an obligation to ensure that the land 
is farmed. The most liberal regulations exist in Ireland (LRI = 0), Greece (LRI = 0.25), and 
the UK (LRI = 0.5) among the old member states and in Romania (LRI = 1.5) and Czech 
Republic (LRI = 2.5) among the new member states.  
The aggregate LRI may bias to some extent the conclusions, in particular for 
countries with medium levels of the LRI.  For example, Belgium has a LRI of 5 but all the 
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regulations are in the rental market, which is very important in Belgium (approximately 
70% of the land is rented) and which is highly regulated: the tenant protection index 
(TPI) is 5 which is the highest of all countries (together with France). However, they 
have no other regulations (the other indices are all 0). The Netherlands is similar to 
Belgium in that it has quite significant regulations in the rental markets to protect the 
tenants (TPI = 5) but almost no other land regulations. This contrasts with France which 
has extensive regulations both in the rental and in the sales markets.  
Another example is Poland. Poland’s LRI is 6.5, but there is a large difference 
between the sales and rental market regulations. In Poland, where most of the land is 
owned and operated by (small) family farms (only 20% is rented), there is very little 
protection for tenants (TPI = 1) but significant regulations protect (family) farms who 
operate on land they own: their owner protection index (OPI) is 3.5. Together with 
Hungary, where the OPI = 5, this is the highest of all countries.  
Figure 2 illustrates this. France has a high regulatory index for both rental and 
sales markets. Belgium and the Netherlands have a high regulation index for rental 
markets but not sales markets; and Poland and Hungary vice versa. Then there is a 
group of countries (including Ireland, Greece, the UK, Finland, Germany and the Czech 
Republic) with very little regulations in either land rental or sales markets.  
Finally, as indicated we aggregated the underlying variables in an alternative way 
to test for the robustness of our findings. The results are shown in Table 6. Table 7 
compares the ranking of the countries based on the different aggregation methods that 
are used. Overall, there are no significant changes in the ranking of the different 
countries between the two aggregation methods, which is evidence of the robustness of 
our results. 
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper we give an overview of the regulations that are present in the land 
market in the EU Member States. We considered four categories of land market 
regulations: (1) measures to protect the tenant; (2) measures to protect the owner-
cultivator; (3) measures to protect the landowner; and (4) measures to prevent 
fragmentation. There is a large variation in land regulations among EU countries and the 
differences are not closely aligned with simple regional or institutional macro-clusters.  
We tried to quantify the extent and differences in regulation by constructing 
indices for the extent of regulations affecting the functioning of agricultural land sales 
and rental markets in the EU. The strongest regulations are not in the former 
Communist Eastern member states of the EU but in some of the Western (long term 
capitalist) countries.   
We observe different groups of countries in land regulatory patterns. First, there 
are governments that strongly regulate both sales and rental markets, such as France 
and Hungary. Second, there are countries with more moderate regulated land markets, 
such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland.  Usually, in these countries one type of 
regulation dominates. For example, Belgium, where approximately 70% of the land is 
rented, has an aggregate land regulation index of 5 but all the regulations are in the 
rental market. Another example is Poland, where most of the land is owned and 
operated by (small) family farms, there is very little protection for tenants but 
significant regulations protect (family) farms who operate on land they own. Third, 
there are countries with less regulated land markets, such as Sweden, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Romania, Finland, the UK, Greece and Ireland.  
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Figure 1: Land regulation indicators 
 
Source: Own calculations based on expert interviews and Ciaian et al. (2010) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
R
e
g
u
la
to
ry
 I
n
d
e
x
 
Total Land Regulation Index/ total LRI Measures to protect the tenant/ TPI
Measures to protect the small owner-cultivator/ OPI Measures to protect the non-farm land owner
Measures to prevent fragmentation
22 
 
Figure 2: Correlation between the Tenant Protection Index (TPI) and the Owner 
Protection Index (OPI) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on expert interviews and Ciaian et al. (2010) 
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Table 1: Land regulation indicators 
Indicator 
 
Variable Variable description Variable categories 
Measures to 
protect the tenant/ 
Tenant Protection 
Index (TPI) 
Maximum rental price Maximum price per 
hectare that is rented 
1 = Existence of a maximum price 
0 = No maximum price 
 
 Minimum rental 
contract duration 
Minimum duration of a 
rental contract 
1= Existence of a minimum rental contract duration 
0= No restrictions 
 
 Automatic rental 
contract renewal 
Regulations in terms of 
automatic renewal of 
the rental contract at 
the end of the duration 
of the contract 
1= Existence of automatic renewal with the 
duration of the initial contract 
0.5 = Existence of automatic renewal with a limited 
duration 
0= No automatic renewal 
 
 Conditions for rental 
contract termination 
Regulations in terms of 
rental contract 
termination 
1 = Termination is possible at the end of the 
contract and if some specific conditions are fulfilled  
0 = Termination is possible at the end of the 
contract 
 
 Pre-emptive right 
tenant 
Pre-emptive right by 
the tenant 
1= Existence of a pre-emptive right by the tenant 
0= No pre-emptive right by the tenant 
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Table 1: Land regulation indicators (continued) 
 
Indicator 
 
Variable Variable description Variable categories 
Measures to 
protect the owner 
cultivator/ Owner 
Protection Index 
(OPI) 
Nationality buyer 
in case of legal 
entities  
Restrictions on sales 
transactions by 
foreign legal entities 
1= Prohibition that legal entities with shares owned by 
foreigners buy land  
0.5=Prohibition that legal entities with a majority of the 
shares hold by foreigners buy land, but no restrictions 
when only minority of the shares is foreign owned  
0.125= A foreign legal entity is allowed to buy or rent 
any plot of agricultural land, except in specific regions  
0= No restrictions 
 
 Nationality buyer 
in case of natural 
persons 
Restrictions on 
transactions by 
foreign natural 
persons 
1= Prohibition of a foreign natural person to buy a 
particular plot of agricultural land unless they have 
been staying and farming in the country for at least 
three years and they rented the particular plot before  
0.75= Prohibition of a foreign natural person to buy a 
plot of agricultural land unless they have been staying 
and farming in the country for at least three years and 
they rented agricultural land before  
0.5= A foreign natural person is allowed to buy or rent 
any plot of agricultural land in case he wants to stay 
and farm in the country 
0.125= A foreign natural person is allowed to buy or 
rent any plot of agricultural land, except land in specific 
regions  
0= No restrictions 
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Table 1: Land regulation indicators (continued) 
 
Indicator 
 
Variable  Variable description Variable categories 
Measures to 
protect the owner 
cultivator/ Owner 
Protection Index 
(OPI) (continued) 
Requirements on the 
new owner 
Restrictions (other than 
nationality of the new user)  
that need to be fulfilled by the 
new owner (e.g. competences) 
 
1= Existence of restrictions on the new 
owner 
0= No restrictions  
 Maximum sales price Minimum sales price per 
hectare that is sold 
1= Existence of a maximum sales price 
0= No  maximum sales price 
 
 Pre-emptive right 
neighboring farmer 
Pre-emptive right by the 
neighboring farmer 
1= Existence of a pre-emptive right by a 
neighboring farmer 
0= No pre-emptive right by a neighboring 
farmer 
 
 Maximum 
transacted/owned area  
Limitations to the maximum 
transacted agricultural area  
1 = Existence of regulations on the  
maximum agricultural area that is 
transacted  
0 = No regulations 
Measures to 
protect the non-
farm owner 
Minimum rental price Minimum rental price per 
hectare that is rented 
1 = Existence  of a minimum rental price 
0 = No minimum rental price 
 
 Maximum rental contract 
duration 
Maximum duration of a rental 
contract  
1= Existence of a maximum rental contract 
duration 
0= No restrictions 
 
Measures to 
prevent 
fragmentation 
Minimum plot size A minimum plot size below 
which a plot cannot be 
subdivided for a transaction 
 
1 = Existence of a minimum plot size 
0 = No minimum plot size 
 Pre-emptive right co-
owner 
Pre-emptive right by the co-
owner 
1= Existence of a pre-emptive right by the 
co-owner 
0= No pre-emptive right by the co-owner 
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Table 2: Legal aspects included in the Indicator “Measures to protect the tenant”/ Tenant Protection Index (TPI) 
 Measures to protect the tenant/ Tenant Protection Index (TPI) 
  Minimum 
rental contract 
duration 
Maximum 
rental price 
Automatic rental contract 
renewal 
Conditions for rental 
contract termination 
Pre-emptive right for tenant 
Austria Yes Yes Yes, by 1 year No No 
Belgium Yes Yes Yes, by initial duration contract Yes Yes 
Denmark No No No No No 
Finland No No No No No 
France Yes Yes Yes, by initial duration contract Yes Yes 
Germany No No Yes, by 1 year No No 
Greece No No No No No 
Ireland No No No No No 
Italy Yes No Yes, by initial duration contract No Yes 
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes, by initial duration contract Yes Yes 
Portugal Yes No Yes, by initial duration contract No Yes 
Sweden No No Yes, by initial duration contract No Yes 
UK No No Yes, by 1 year No No 
Czech Republic No No Yes, by 1 year No No 
Hungary No No No No Yes 
Latvia No No No No Yes 
Lithuania No No No No Yes 
Poland No No No No Yes 
Romania No No No No Yes 
Slovakia Yes No Yes, by initial duration contract No No 
Slovenia Yes No Yes, by initial duration contract No Yes 
Source: Own calculations based on expert interviews and Ciaian et al. (2010) 
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Table 3: Legal aspects included in the Indicator “Measures to protect the small owner-cultivators”/ Owner Protection 
Index (OPI) 
 Measures to protect the small owner-cultivators/ Owner Protection Index (OPI) 
  Restrictions 
nationality buyer 
for legal entities 
Restrictions 
nationality buyer for 
natural persons 
Other 
restrictions for 
the new owner 
Maximum 
sales price 
Pre-emptive right 
neighboring farmer 
Maximum 
transacted/ 
owned area 
Austria No No Yes Yes No No 
Belgium No No No No No No 
Denmark No No Yes No No Yes 
Finland 
Yes, but only in very 
specific regions 
Yes, but only in very 
specific regions 
No No No No 
France No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Germany No No No No No No 
Greece 
Yes, but only in very 
specific regions 
Yes, but only in very 
specific regions 
No No No No 
Ireland No No No No No No 
Italy No No No No Yes No 
Netherlands No No No No No No 
Portugal No No No No Yes No 
Sweden No No No No No No 
UK No No No No No No 
Czech Republic No No No No No No 
Hungary Yes, prohibition Yes, only allowed if * Yes No Yes Yes 
Latvia 
Yes, when majority 
shares is foreign 
owned 
Yes, only allowed if * No No Yes No 
Lithuania No Yes, only allowed if ** No No No Yes 
Poland 
Yes, when majority 
shares is foreign 
owned 
Yes, only allowed if * Yes Yes No No 
Romania No Yes, only allowed if *** No No No No 
Slovakia No Yes, only allowed if * No No No No 
Slovenia No No No No Yes No 
Note: * Prohibition of a foreign natural person to buy a particular plot of agricultural land unless they have been staying and farming in the country for 
at least three years and they rented the particular plot before; ** Prohibition of a foreign natural person to buy a plot of agricultural land unless they 
have been staying and farming in the country for at least three years and they rented agricultural land before; *** A foreign natural person is allowed to 
buy or rent any plot of agricultural land in case he wants to stay and farm in the country 
Source: Own calculations based on expert interviews and Ciaian et al. (2010) 
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Table 4: Legal aspects included in the indicators “Measures to protect the non-farm owner” and “Measures to prevent 
fragmentation” 
 Measures to protect the non-farm owner Measures to prevent fragmentation 
  
Minimum rental price 
Maximum rental 
contract duration 
Minimum plot size 
Pre-emptive right   
co-owner 
Austria Yes No No No 
Belgium No No No No 
Denmark No Yes No No 
Finland No Yes No No 
France Yes No No No 
Germany No No Yes No 
Greece No No No No 
Ireland No No No No 
Italy No No No Yes 
Netherlands Yes No No No 
Portugal No No No Yes 
Sweden No Yes No No 
UK No No No No 
Czech Republic Yes No No Yes 
Hungary No Yes No Yes 
Latvia No No No No 
Lithuania No No Yes Yes 
Poland No Yes No Yes 
Romania No No No No 
Slovakia No Yes Yes Yes 
Slovenia No No No Yes 
Source: Own calculations based on expert interviews and Ciaian et al. (2010) 
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Table 5: Land regulation indicators 
 Measures to protect 
the tenant/  
Tenant Protection 
Index (TPI) 
Measures to protect the 
small owner-
cultivator/ Owner 
Protection Index (OPI) 
Measures to 
protect the non-
farm owner 
Measures to 
prevent 
fragmentation 
Total Land 
Regulation 
Index (LRI) 
France 5 3 1 0 9 
Hungary 1 5 1 1 8 
Poland 1 3.5 1 1 6.5 
Slovakia 2 1 1 2 6 
Netherlands 5 0 0 1 6 
Austria 2.5 2 1 0 5.5 
Belgium 5 0 0 0 5 
Italy 3 1 0 1 5 
Portugal 
 
1 0 1 5 
Slovenia 3 1 0 1 5 
Lithuania 1 1.75 0 2 4.75 
Latvia 1 2.5 0 0 3.5 
Sweden 2 0 1 0 3 
Denmark 0 2 1 0 3 
Czech 
Republic 
0.5 0 1 1 2.5 
Germany 0.5 0 0 1 1.5 
Romania 1 0.5 0 0 1.5 
Finland 0 0.25 1 0 1.25 
UK 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 
Greece 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 
Note that each sub-indicator is the sum of the underlying variables and the total LRI is the sum of the four sub-indicators. 
Hence the total LRI is a simple aggregation of all underlying variables.  
Source: Own calculations based on expert interviews and Ciaian et al. (2010)  
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Table 6: Robustness check: Land regulation indicators based on a different aggregation method* 
 
Measures to protect 
the tenant/  
Tenant Protection 
Index (TPI) 
Measures to protect 
the small owner-
cultivator/ Owner 
Protection Index 
(OPI) 
Measures to 
protect the non-
farm land owner 
Measures to 
prevent 
fragmentation 
Total Land 
Regulation 
Index (LRI) 
Slovakia 0.4 0.17 0.5 1 2.07 
Hungary 0.2 0.83 0.5 0.5 2.03 
France 1 0.5 0.5 0 2 
Poland 0.2 0.58 0.5 0.5 1.78 
Netherlands 1 0 0 0.5 1.49 
Lithuania 0.2 0.29 0 1 1.33 
Austria 0.5 0.33 0.5 0 1.27 
Italy 0.6 0.17 0 0.5 1.27 
Portugal 0.6 0.17 0 0.5 1.27 
Slovenia 0.6 0.17 0 0.5 1.1 
Czech Republic 0.1 0 0.5 0.5 1 
Belgium 1 0 0 0 0.9 
Sweden 0.4 0 0.5 0 0.8 
Denmark 0 0.33 0.5 0 0.62 
Latvia 0.2 0.42 0 0 0.6 
Germany 0.1 0 0 0.5 0.54 
Finland 0 0.04 0.5 0 0.28 
Romania 0.2 0.08 0 0 0.1 
UK 0.1 0 0 0 0.04 
Greece 0 0.04 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 
* Each sub-indicator is a weighted sum of the underlying variables and ranges between 0 and 1. The total LRI is the sum of the 
four sub-indicators. 
Source: Own calculations based on expert interviews and Ciaian et al. (2010)
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Table 7: Robustness check: ranking of the countries according to the different types 
of aggregation 
 Aggregation of the  underlying 
variables 
Aggregation of the sub-
indicators, weighted by the 
number of underlying variables 
1 France Slovakia 
2 Hungary Hungary 
3 Poland France 
4 Slovakia Poland 
5 Netherlands Netherlands 
6 Austria Lithuania 
7 Belgium Austria 
8 Italy Italy 
9 Portugal Portugal 
10 Slovenia Slovenia 
11 Lithuania Czech Republic 
12 Latvia Belgium 
13 Sweden Sweden 
14 Denmark Denmark 
15 Czech Republic Latvia 
16 Germany Germany 
17 Romania Finland 
18 Finland Romania 
19 UK UK 
20 Greece Greece 
21 Ireland Ireland 
Source: Own calculations based on expert interviews and Ciaian et al. (2010) 
 
 
 
 
